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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Peter A. Dammann*
Federal Court Enjoins Third Degree Tactics of State Police-A French citi-
zen suspected of murdering his wife recently obtained an injunction
from a federal district court restraining Georgia law enforcement of-
ficers from further detaining and questioning him without a warrant
and without advice of counsel in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the Federal Civil Rights Statute. Refoule v. Ellis, 74 F. Supp.
336 (N.D., Georgia, 1947). The case is apparently the first in which a
federal court by means of an injunction has directly interferred with
criminal investigation by state authorities.
The district judge based his injunction upon a finding of fact that
plaintiff had been questioned over long periods of time on four separate
occasions by local police without advice of counsel and under circum-
stances which the judge held to be "inherently coercive." The first
questioning, which was conducted at police headquarters, commenced in
the late evening and concluded at 3:30 o'clock the following morning.
Four days later plaintiff was again questioned, this time from just be-
fore dark until 10 o'clock the next morning, but he was held in custody
until 4 o'clock that afternoon. On the third occasion five days later
plaintiff was questioned in the chambers of a judge of the Civil Court
of Fulton County from about 1:30 o'clock a.m. until 4:30 o'clock a.m.
On none of these three detentions had a warrant been issued for his ar-
rest. The last questioning occurred about 20 days later between the hours
of 8:30 p.m. and 2:45 o'clock the following afternoon, when he was
finally placed in the County Jail under charges of sodomy. He alleged
that during the interrogation he was forced to submit to seven lie-de-
tector tests and that the police had inflicted violence on his person to
coerce his confession. Holding that it was unnecessary to resolve a sharp
conflict in the evidence as to whether plaintiff had been physically mal-
treated and as to whether he had submitted to the examination and lie-
detector tests voluntarily, Judge Underwood found that the case fell
within the rule of Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944), which
bans as a denial of due process the use in state criminal proceedings of
confessions obtained under circumstances "inherently coercive." (See
the note on page 627 of this issue for a discussion of recent United
States Supreme Court decisions involving involuntary confessions).
Since the defendant state officers contended that they had a right to
question plaintiff in such a manner and indicated they would do so again
if they found it desirable, the court concluded that a preliminary in-
junction was necessary to protect plaintiff from further infringement
of his rights under the Constitution and the Civil Rights Statute (17
Stat. 3, 8 U.S.C.A. §43). The court enjoined "the exercise of personal
restraint over plaintiff by defendants without a warrant or confinement
without lawful arrest, and from further questioning plaintiff without
his consent after being afforded an opportunity of consulting with his
counsel. "
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For law enforcement officials, the most interesting question in the
Refoule case concerned the court's jurisdiction to issue the injunction
against the state officers. Plaintiff had claimed federal jurisdiction both
on the grounds of diversity of citizenship and of the infringement of afederal right. The court's opinion would seem to indicate that the Four-
teenth Amendment alone was sufficient to vest the Federal court withjurisdiction, although he also relied heavily on the Civil Rights Statute.
This act, adopted by Congress in 1871 as a result of the Civil War, au-
thorized an action for damages or a suit in equity in a federal court
against "every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory," deprives any person
"of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws."
A further demand by Refoule to suppress various statements and re-
cordings secured during the periods of detention was denied by the
court on the grounds that a court of equity is without jurisdiction topass on the admissibility of evidence in a criminal case and that Re-
foule would have an opportunity to challenge the use of the evidence in
a criminal trial by appropriate objection. (But see the case note in
the last issue of this journal by Conwill, Suppression Prior to Indict-
ment of Confessions Unconstitutionally Obtained (1948) 38 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 509).
Rejection of Testimony of Officers Who Abuse Arrested Persons-The Su-
preme Court of Tennessee has recently announced an unusual rule re-
quiring the rejection of all testimony of law enforcement officers who
participated in physically abusing the defendant. In Churn v. State,
202 S.W. (2d) 345 (Tenn., 1947) defendant had been convicted of pos-
sessing a still for the manufacture of intoxicating liquor. At the trial
defendant testified that the sheriff and two deputies who arrested him
had beaten his head with their pistol butts in an unsuccessful attempt
to extort a confession. One of the deputies admitted the assault. Since
defendant was also able to prove a plausible alibi and since the testi-
mony of the three officers was materially contradictory, the Tennessee
Supreme Court could have reversed the conviction on the sole ground
that it was unsupported by the evidence. However, the court took the
opportunity to rule that the testimony of the officers should have been
rejected, and proceeded to denounce third degree practices in the fol-
lowing language (at p. 347):
"We now go further than we have found occasion to go in any re-ported case heretofore and lay down the rule that, when it appears
beyond reasonable doubt that an officer, unless in self-defense, or so re-
quired to prevent the escape of one charged with a felony, has physically
assaulted a prisoner while in his care, thus violating his official obliga-
tion, the criminal law and the constitutional rights of the prisoner, his
testimony, and that of his associate officers present without protest
at the time, will be received with great caution. The testimony of of-
ficers of the law who so far disregard their obligations, while admissible,
will not be given favorable consideration in the determination of the
case. A partial analogy is offered in the well-established rule that the
courts will not admit the testimony of officers who have violated the
constitutional prohibition against searches and seizures, holding it to bebetter that the guilty should escape than that officers of the law should
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be permitted to give testimony procured by violation of the law they
are sworn to enforce.
"This case might well be reversed upon the strength of the alibi
and the directly contradictory testimony of these officers as to the ma-
terial matters hereinbefore mentioned, but we choose to put the reversal
squarely upon the ground of the rejection in toto of the testimony of
these officers because of their abuse of the prisoner, which could have
been for no other purpose than to force an admission from him of
guilt,--or in the otherwise unlawful exercise of brutal and cowardly
impulses. "
Lie-detector Test Results Inadmissible as Evidence-The Supreme Court of
Kansas, in State v. Lowry, 163 Kans. 622, 185 Pac. (2d) 147 (1947),
recently reversed a trial court conviction because the prosecution had
been permitted to introduce in evidence the results of lie-detector tests
upon a complaining witness and a defendant accused of felonious as-
sault. The Kansas Supreme Court held that the lie-detector technique
had not yet gained sufficient scientific recognition to warrant the ac-
ceptance of the test results as competent legal evidence. At the same
time, however, the court pointed out that its holding should not be in-
terpreted as discrediting the lie-detector "as an instrument of utility
and value," since "its usefulness has been amply demonstrated by de-
tective agencies, police departments and other law-enforcement agen-
cies conducting criminal investigations."
(For a detailed discussion of the legal. status of lie-detector test re-
sults, see Inbau, F.E., Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation (2d
ed., 1948) at pp. 83-96.)
Compulsory Urinalysis Not Violative of Constitutional Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination-The privilege against self-incrimination has been held not
to apply to an urinalysis made under police supervision. In Ridgell v.
United States, 54 A. (2d) 679 (D.C.Mun.App.1947) defendant, who
admittedly had had a "few" beers, overturned his automobile, killing
a passenger. Shortly after the accident he was taken to a hospital
where he voluntarily gave a specimen of his urine in order that police
could determine its alcoholic content. In affirming a conviction of negli-
gent homicide, the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia did not limit itself to the narrow ground that defendant had
waived the privilege by submitting to the test voluntarily after being
warned that the results might be used against him. Instead the court
indicated that it would consider as admissible the findings from an
urinalysis regardless of whether the specimen was given voluntarily.
"The whole history of the privilege against self-incrimination shows
that it was designed to protect against testimonial compulsion. There
was no such compulsion here," the court ruled. It cited McFarland v.
United States, 150 F. (2d) 593 (App.D.C.1945) cert. denied, 326 U.S.
788 (1946), a murder case in which defendant, an enlisted man, had
been subjected to a compulsory physical examination by military order.
The discovery during the examination of blood upon defendant's body
was held admissible on the grounds that "out of court as well as in
court, his body may be examined with or without his consent."
The rule of the Ridgell and McFarland cases is consistent with the
view urged in 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d. ed. 1940) §§2263, 2265 and ac-
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cepted by many courts; that is, that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion should be limited to oral statements and should not be extended to
cover physical data obtained through scientific examination. (For more
extensive discussions of this problem see Mamet, Constitutionality of
Compulsory Chemical Tests to Determine Alcoholic Intoxication (1945)
36 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 132.)
County Has No Power to Make Drunken Driving a Crime-The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin has recently invalidated an ordinance of Winnebago
County which made driving an automobile while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not exceeding
$100.00 or by imprisonment for no longer than six months, or both. The
ordinance conformed to a state statute (Wis. Stats. (1943) §85.84)
which purported to delegate authority to counties to enact ordinances
regulating local traffic. Holding both the statute and the ordinance in-
valid, the court ruled that only the sovereign state can define crimes and
that the state legislature can not constitutionally delegate power to coun-
ties to create misdemeanors. The court indicated, however, that a county
could provide for civil actions at law leading to the forfeiture of auto-
mobiles driven by intoxicated drivers. State v. Schmiege, 251 Wis. 79,
28 N.W. (2d) 345 (1947). (See the comment in a recent issue of this
review, Block, Conflicting State and Local Laws (1947) 38 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 40; also see comment on this case, entitled "The Viola-
tion of a Municipal Ordinance as a Crime," by Stanley D. Rose in
(1947) 1 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 262.)
Policemen Convicted of Common Law Offense of Negligent Escape-Two
prisoners awaiting execution escaped from the death cell of the Wash-
ington Jail, Washington, D.C., early one April morning, 1946. In the
subsequent popular excitement over what soon became known as the fa-
mous Medley escape, the District of Columbia prosecuted two officers of
the Metropolitan Police Department, who had been temporarily detailed
to guard the two prisoners, for the little heard of common law offense of
negligent escape. After a finding of guilty by the jury, the trial judge
ordered an arrest of judgment, United States v. Davis, 71 F. Supp. 749
(Dist.Ct.D.C.1947), but the United States Court of Appeals, District of
Columbia, reversed and ordered that judgment be entered on the ver-
dicts, United States v. Davis, No. 9563 (App.D.C.1948).
At that time there were no statutory provisions covering the offense
and no precedents in the District of Columbia or in Maryland, from
which the District derives its common law, to support the prosecution.
The appellate court, therefore, dusted off early English cases as author-
ity for the convictions. Quoting from 1 Burn's Justice of the Peace
(8th ed. 1764) 6, the court defined negligent escape as "when the party
arrested or imprisoned doth escape against the will of him that arrested
or imprisoned him, and is not freshly .pursued and taken again before
he hath lost the sight of him."
The trial judge, who had been impressed by the novelty of the prose-
cution, noted that the statute which retained common law crimes not
otherwise covered in the criminal code and not inconsistent with other
statutes made all such offenses felonies [D. C. Code (1940) §22-107].
Thus the offense of negligent escape, which under the common law was
considered a misdemeanor and was ordinarily punishable by fine, was
[Vol. 38
LEGAL ABSTRACTS
converted by the statute into a felony. Impressed by the hardship upon
the officers of being branded felons, the court invoked the rule that defi-
nitions of crimes should be strictly construed in favor of defendants and
helihl lhat the prosecution for negligent escape would lie only against the
sheriff, warden, or person in charge of the institution, but not the police
officers. The appellate court, however, distinguished the precedents re-
lied upon by the trial court on the ground that they applied only to
private servants employed by wardens to guard prisoners, and ruled
that police officers were as directly responsible as any other public of-
ficial for the escape of persons under their charge.
(The Medley escape also lead to the enactment of a federal escape
statute in 1947 (35 Stat. 1113, 18 U.S.C.A. 244), which was the subject
of a legal abstract in a recent issue of this journal, (1947) 38 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 441).
Negligence of Fireman (or Policeman) Not Imputable to His Superior-Police
officers will be interested in a recent law suit arising out of a collision
between a truck and a fire engine which was responding to a fire alarm.
A lieutenant of the Oklahoma City Fire Department who was injured
in the crash sued the owner of the truck for damages. Defendant con-
tended that the contributory negligence of the driver of the fire engine
in crashing into the truck could be imputed to the lieutenant, who was
the official in charge. The Oklahoma Supreme Court expressly rejected
the contention that the negligence of the driver could be imputed to his
superior, but held that whether the lieutenant was negligent in not exer-
cising his authority to control and direct the driver or whether he exer-
cised this power in a negligent manner was a questioi to be decided by
the jury. Vogler v. Jones, 186 P. (2d) 315 (Okla., 1947).
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